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1. Introduction 
It is very likely that Plato used a system of symbolic notation when developing the 
dialectical science. He must have had a simplified way to express combinations of 
different forms, representing them with letters or other symbols. It is difficult to see how 
else he could have created the Parmenides dialogue, considering its logical complexity. 
Written in the fullness of his thoughts, it hides his intentions; it ensnares the reader, 
confusing them with words with multiple meanings; it uses ambiguous expressions and 
gives rise to incorrect interpretations. Almost twenty-four centuries later, it still resists 
being interpreted with a sufficiently clear meaning. As there are no reliable data or 
references, it is difficult to reconstruct the symbols or diagrams he may once have used.1 
Whether or not Plato designed such a system, the logical resources suggested below are 
of substantial benefit for understanding the dialogue’s ambiguous arguments, and they 
contribute to preserving the consistency of the set during analysis. In this paper, I will test 
these new tools on different passages, trying to solve some of the problems that have 
resisted other interpretations. 
 
2. Symbolisation of the central hypotheses of the dialogue 
The Parmenides discusses eight hypotheses (or eight groups of arguments) related 
to the concept of the one. Four of these – the first, fourth, sixth and eighth – emphasise 
the limitations of Parmenidean thought, demonstrating the contradictory results that 
follow from envisaging a one that has no parts and is not a whole. These arguments are 
not made solely for critical purposes; they often clarify the assertive use of the dialectical 
                                                          
1 Books VI and VII of the Republic seem to indicate that the use of “images” makes mathematical 
knowledge less valuable than dialectics; however, it would be excessive to reject systems of symbolic 
notation and diagrams that work with the forms themselves for that reason. To better understand Plato’s 
caution, consider his method for working with physical magnitudes. For example, when studying time, he 
is careful to relate its quantity with the intelligible realm and to identify representations of the past and 
future with movements in the generated realm (see Parmenides 151e-155c and Timaeus 37e-38a), and when 
dealing with the magnitude of a movement, he separates the numerical calculation of distances and the 
position or place occupied by sensibles into different domains. This method allows velocities to be 
determined without obstruction, making it easier to respond to paradoxes such as Zeno’s arguments against 
motion. (See Matía Cubillo (c)). 
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method that is applied to the other four hypotheses.2 These remaining hypotheses look at 
four expressions formed from pairs of very broad opposing forms: one (o) and not-one 
(ō), being (b) and not-being (b̄). 
In the second hypothesis (H2), the one is linked with being, forming “the one that 
is” (bo); in the third hypothesis (H3), this combination leads to the not-one being linked 
with not-being in “the not-one that is not” (b̄ō). In the fifth hypothesis (H5), the 
combination of the one and not-being produces “the one that is not” (b̄o); meanwhile, the 
not-one is linked with being in “the not-one that is” (bō), which is the focus of the seventh 
hypothesis (H7). The mutual dependencies do not end here. Plato allows communication 
between “the one that is” and “the one that is not”, as well as between “the not-one that 
is not” and “the not-one that is”, which is also examined in these hypotheses.3 
In each of the basic sentences (bo, b̄ō, b̄o and bō), two forms are directly connected. 
Following the dialectical method, other opposing forms that are present in these 
groupings and that lead to their division must be identified, creating new formulae.4 
Among the Greatest Kinds, this role is played by the forms of sameness or identity (s) and 
difference or contrariety (s̄);5 with these, eight combinations are obtained: sbo, sb̄ō, sb̄o, 
sbō, s̄bo, s̄b̄ō, s̄b̄o and s̄bō. To get an idea of the logical values of some of these statements, 
it is worth taking the proposition for which Plato provides the most information, “the one 
that is” in H2, and examining the two formulae that are derived from it. 
When “the one that is” participates in sameness, this establishes that the one and 
being are inseparable; they are interconnected to the extent that the formula sbo 
constitutes a “whole”, which cannot be divided to isolate any individual form: 
So what is one is a whole and has a part. 
Of course. 
What about each of the parts of the one which is, namely, its unity and its being? 
Would unity be lacking to the part which is, or being to the part which is one? 
No. 
                                                          
2 See Parmenides 142b-157b (second), 157b-159b (third), 160b-163b (fifth) y 164b-165e (seventh). This 
classification of the hypotheses based on two incompatible interpretations of the one is found in Cornford 
(1939: 109-115). Turnbull (1998: 47-50) speaks even more explicitly of a “Parmenidean Version” and a 
“Platonic Version” when classifying the eight parts of the dialectical exercise. 
3 See Parmenides 136a-c. 
4 See Philebus 16c-19b. 
5 See Sophist 254d-255e. 
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So once again, each of the parts contains unity and being, and the least part also turns 
out to consist of two parts, and the same account is ever true: whatever becomes a 
part ever contains the two parts. For unity ever contains being, and being unity; so 
that they are ever necessarily becoming two and are never one. 
Quite so.6 
However, when “the one that is” participates in difference instead, i.e. in the 
sentence s̄bo, in this case it is feasible to separate out the multiple “parts” or individual 
forms that it contains: 
Let us see. Since unity is not being, but, as one, gets a share of being, the being of it 
must be one thing, and it must be another. 
Necessarily. 
Now, if its being is one thing and unity is another, unity is not different from its being 
by virtue of being one, nor is its being other than unity by virtue of being; but they 
are different from each other by virtue of the different and other. 
Of course.7 
Later in this paper, I will explain how Plato regroups these forms to produce evenness, 
oddness and the numbers. This allows a bijection (to use an anachronistic term) to be 
established between s̄bo and sbo, between the “parts” and the “whole”.8 
Other attributions of meaning are likewise open for debate; direct participation in 
not-being could refer to thought, supported by words and other representations,9 and 
                                                          
6 Parmenides 142d-143a, translated by Allen (1997). For this and other direct quotes from Plato, I have 
transcribed the Greek text according to Burnet’s edition (1900-1907): ─Καὶ ὅλον ἄρα ἐστί, ὃ ἂν ἓν ᾖ, καὶ 
μόριον ἔχει. ─Πάνυ γε. ─Τί οὖν; τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον τούτων τοῦ ἑνὸς ὄντος, τό τε ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἆρα 
ἀπολείπεσθον ἢ τὸ ἓν τοῦ εἶναι μορίου ἢ τὸ ὂν τοῦ ἑνὸς μορίου; ─Οὐκ ἂν εἴη. ─Πάλιν ἄρα καὶ τῶν μορίων 
ἑκάτερον τό τε ἓν ἴσχει καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ γίγνεται τὸ ἐλάχιστον ἐκ δυοῖν αὖ μορίοιν τὸ μόριον, καὶ κατὰ τὸν 
αὐτὸν λόγον οὕτως ἀεί, ὅτιπερ ἂν μόριον γένηται, τούτω τὼ μορίω ἀεὶ ἴσχει: τό τε γὰρ ἓν τὸ ὂν ἀεὶ ἴσχει 
καὶ τὸ ὂν τὸ ἕν: ὥστε ἀνάγκη δύ᾽ ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον μηδέποτε ἓν εἶναι. ─Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 
7 Parmenides 143b, trans. cit. Burnet (1900-1907): ─Ἴδωμεν δή: ἄλλο τι ἕτερον μὲν ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν 
αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἕτερον δὲ αὐτό, εἴπερ μὴ οὐσία τὸ ἕν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἓν οὐσίας μετέσχεν. ─Ἀνάγκη. ─Οὐκοῦν εἰ 
ἕτερον μὲν ἡ οὐσία, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἕν, οὔτε τῷ ἓν τὸ ἓν τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερον οὔτε τῷ οὐσία εἶναι ἡ οὐσία τοῦ 
ἑνὸς ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων. ─Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 
8 A discussion of the concepts of “parts” and “whole” in the two referenced passages can be found in the 
monograph by Harte (2002: 78-83). While sympathising with mereology, the author takes a broader 
perspective when studying these two concepts. However, she does not identify the expression “parts” with 
a combination of difference, being and the one, but only with each form separately. In her eagerness to 
emphasise the dependency of the “parts” upon the “whole”, she does not consider difference and identity 
as connections to alternative formulae. In other contexts, the two terms do take on the meaning indicated 
by Harte, distinguishing the formulae of the lower segments from those of the higher segments, in the 
generated and intelligible realms. 
9 It is perplexing that the innovative idea suggested by Marcos de Pinotti (1997: 62, 69, 76, 80) has not been 
explored from a logical perspective. 
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participation in being could refer to whatever is independent of thought, the “thing itself, 
which is knowable and truly exists”. The self-predication caused by separating a form 
(F-ness) from its use as a predicate (F)10 is neatly avoided by introducing a specific form 
to denote language and predication. This interpretation also circumvents any 
conceptualist ontology in the strong sense, as it legitimises combinations of forms that do 
not immediately participate in thought or not-being.11 There is no longer any danger in 
acknowledging that the study of forms, structured around the logical formulation of their 
various valid combinations, leads to ambiguities regarding the linguistic and ontological 
values of those forms. (Anything that itself participates in being and not in not-being must 
still be denoted by a logical symbol that allows to work with groupings of the 
corresponding forms.) 
 
3. The distinction between immediate participation and relational 
participation. Application to the forms of identity and contrariety in Parmenides 147b 
The concept of “participation” is obscure and controversial, a description that could 
broadly apply to all of the main technical terms of Platonic doctrine. Throughout this 
article, it has simply been used to denote the means of communication between forms or 
groups of forms.12 It is reasonable to postpone any consideration of the gnoseological and 
ontological implications until a better understanding of the logical constraints introduced 
by the dialectical method is obtained. 
In the statements sbo, sb̄ō, sb̄o, sbō, s̄bo, s̄b̄ō, s̄b̄o and s̄bō, the forms are combined 
without making any distinction between variables and logical operators and without 
adding any terms between them; this is called “immediate” or “direct” participation. After 
taking the precaution of restricting these formulae to the lower segments of the intelligible 
                                                          
10 Cf. Vlastos (1995:167, 170, 174 n. 13, 180-182). 
11 In Parmenides 132b-c, Plato mentions the aporiae that result from conceptualism, which states that forms 
are only thoughts. This means, among other things, that under this assumption each form is a thought of 
another thought-form, in an implicit regression to infinity. As I have tried to show elsewhere (see Matía 
Cubillo (a)), preventing formulae that belong to the higher segments of the intelligible or generated realms 
from participating directly in the form of not-being counters this version of the Third Man Argument and 
gives being ontological priority over not-being. Plato introduces the rule to follow when creating formulae 
in the guise of an aporia. (Note that Helming (2007: 323 n. 58) has argued, against authors such as Rickless 
(2007: 75-80), that the referenced text does not involve any regression to infinity, and therefore he does not 
acknowledge any “third man”.) 
12 See Parménides 133c-d. 
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or generated realms (thus preventing any regression to infinity), they can now be 
recombined with each other through the forms of identity and contrariety themselves. 
Two statements can participate, through each other, in forms that are in turn grouped into 
higher-level formulae belonging to the higher segments of the intelligible or generated 
realms; this is called “relational”, “mutual” or “mediate” participation. (Insofar as sbo 
and s̄bo are inferred relationally, the ranges of the “whole” and the “parts” must be 
specified for the isomorphism referenced in the previous section.) This concept has 
implications for the general doctrine of forms, as it prevents direct self-reference and its 
resulting paradoxes. If a statement participates in a form immediately, it does not 
participate directly in itself again or in its opposite; however, in relation to another 
statement, it may participate in the same form (relational reflexivity) or in its opposite 
(without violating the principle of non-contradiction), as applicable.13 This is the 
distinction underlying statements like the following: 
So unity, it seems, is different from the others [s̄∙s̄b̄ō-sbo] and itself [s̄∙sb̄o-s̄bo], and 
the same as the others [s∙sb̄ō-s̄bo] and itself [s∙s̄b̄o-sbo]. 
Yes, so it appears from this account.14  
I omit the discussion of the reasoning that leads to this conclusion; the reader can 
confirm its consistency using the truth tables given below. The gaps left open in the 
meaning of the statement have been filled in with symbols between brackets. Plato avoids 
defining which “one” he is referring to on each occasion, whether it is “the one that is” 
or “the one that is not”; he also fails to report its participation in sameness or difference, 
and proceeds likewise with “the others” or “the not-one”. This is a deliberate method of 
playing with the ambiguities of language, omitting the necessary information and 
producing confusion without causing contradictions. However, specifying the 
expressions any further would give Plato’s writing a literary tone that would be difficult 
                                                          
13 By distinguishing these two types of participation, it is possible to deal with controversies regarding the 
axioms or principles of self-participation and purity (by which a form cannot participate in its opposite). 
Self-participation cannot be applied to the forms immediately or directly, but does apply to some of them 
relationally. The axiom of purity is always valid for immediate participation and in some cases for relational 
participation. The principal of self-participation has been discussed in the specialist literature. The desire 
to resolve the contradictions that arise from its inclusion in Plato’s philosophy is clearly evident in Vlastos 
(1981: 335-365), especially with regard to the Third Man Argument. A good overview of the most 
controversial issues in the criticism of the Parmenides was written by Rickless (Spring 2020). 
The concept of mediate or relational participation could also reopen certain parts of an old debate. It would 
be bold to claim that this tool is essential for the study of Plato, but in any case, its usage certainly challenges 
the methods used in the referenced studies to approach difficulties with interpreting the dialogue. 
14 Parmenides 147b, trans. cit. Burnet (1900-1907): ─Τὸ ἓν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἕτερόν τε τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶν καὶ 
ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταὐτὸν ἐκείνοις τε καὶ ἑαυτῷ. ─κινδυνεύει φαίνεσθαι ἐκ γε τοῦ λόγου. 
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to evaluate. That is, stylistically speaking, is it not better simply to state that “the one is 
different from the others” rather than specifying that “the one that is, to the extent of its 
sameness, is contrary to the not-one that is not where this participates in difference”? 
Consider how Plato’s full statement appears in a free translation into more rigorous 
language: 
Thus, the one that is, to the extent of its sameness, seemingly opposes the not-one 
that is not where this participates in difference (s̄∙s̄b̄ō-sbo), whereas by having 
difference it is contrary to the one that is not in its sameness (s̄∙sb̄o-s̄bo); 
furthermore, the one that is, when it participates in difference, is identical to the not-
one that, not being, has sameness (s∙sb̄ō-s̄bo), and conversely, when it participates 
in sameness, it is identical to the one that is not in its difference (s∙s̄b̄o-sbo).  
The relational use of participation allows various meanings to be superimposed onto the 
same form, and Plato uses this skilfully to create confusion in the dialogue. 
 
4. Considerations on dialectical logic. The possibility of creating truth tables 
adapted for symbolisation 
The forms of identity and contrariety are fundamental threads in the conceptual 
fabric of the Parmenides, constituting the main links between formulae. Before 
continuing with the dialogue, I should first clarify some points of the logic underlying the 
dialectics. The procedures used sometimes differ from the standard procedures of logic. 
4.1 Not-being is a form and not a connector. Opposing forms. Derived formulae 
and hypotheses with opposing truth values 
It is probably the Sophist that most clearly states that not-being is an individual 
form: 
VISITOR: Because he [Parmenides] says, I think, ‘For never shall this prevail, that 
things that are not are; / I tell you, keep back your thought from this path of inquiry.’ 
THEAETETUS: Yes, he does say that. 
VISITOR: Whereas we have not only shown that what is not is, but have declared 
what the form of what is not actually is; for having shown up the nature of difference 
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as something that is, cut up into pieces over all the things that are in their 
relationships with each other, we took our courage in our hands and said of the part 
of it that is contraposed to the what is of each thing that it was the very thing that 
what is not really is. 
THEAETETUS: Yes, stranger, and what we have said seems to be as completely 
true as it could be.15 
The reasoning that leads to this conclusion confirms that being and not-being are 
opposites in the lower segments, by dividing the higher-range formula that combines 
difference with being. (I suggest rereading Sophist 257b-258e from this perspective.) The 
fact that Plato started from the latter two forms to demonstrate the existence of not-being 
does not imply that the same division cannot be achieved by grouping identity with being. 
There is also no reason to infer that not-being cannot participate immediately in sameness. 
It is more reasonable to suppose that, relationally, not-being is subordinate to being.16 
It must never be assumed that not-being is the “opposite” of being in the sense that 
this term has in the simpler logic of statements. As not-being is an individual form, it 
cannot be treated as a propositional formula derived by applying the negative operator to 
being; its significance is therefore not completely restricted.17 The type of opposition that 
arises between not-being and being may very well reflect the distinction between 
whatever exists as thought (or language) and whatever is separately from this. 
Despite what the symbols used above may suggest, no isolated Platonic form can 
be equated to a propositional variable with two or more truth values in the calculus of 
statements. This is an erroneous formalisation of the language of the Parmenides that has 
been damaging for the various approaches to this work undertaken using the tools of logic. 
Different truth values must be attributed to combinations of forms. Both not-being and 
                                                          
15 Sophist 258d-e, translated by C. Rowe (2015). Burnet (1900-1907): ─Ὅτι ὁ μέν πού φησιν─ Οὐ γὰρ 
μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ, εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα, ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα. ─Λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως. 
─Ἡμεῖς δέ γε οὐ μόνον τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν ἀπεδείξαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὃ τυγχάνει ὂν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος 
ἀπεφηνάμεθα· τὴν γὰρ θατέρου φύσιν ἀποδείξαντες οὖσάν τε καὶ κατακεκερματισμένην ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα 
πρὸς ἄλληλα, τὸ πρὸς τὸ ὂν ἕκαστον μόριον αὐτῆς ἀντιτιθέμενον ἐτολμήσαμεν εἰπεῖν ὡς αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν 
ὄντως τὸ μὴ ὄν. ─Καὶ παντάπασί γε, ὦ ξένε, ἀληθέστατά μοι δοκοῦμεν εἰρηκέναι. ─Ἡμεῖς δέ γε οὐ μόνον 
τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν ἀπεδείξαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὃ τυγχάνει ὂν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀπεφηνάμεθα. 
16 See Matía Cubillo (a). 
17 Fine (1993: 108-110, 112-116, 113 n. 53, 114 n. 55) distinguishes “opposites” from “negations”, 
considering the former to be forms or properties (“genuine features of reality”), while the latter are only 
“complements of properties or kinds”. Fine admits that, for Plato, not-being is a form in its own sense, but 
as long as no function can be found to isolate it, she accepts the extended interpretation that equates it to 
difference as one and the same form.  
9 
 
being must be combined with other forms to produce sentences that occasionally have 
opposing truth values. (In the interpretation, the opposing formulae may not be mutually 
exclusive in an absolute sense; as such, it would be logically viable to say something false 
about something that exists or to express a truthful opinion about something that happens 
or is in motion.) 
In Platonic dialectics, if two forms are “opposites” (being and not-being, one and 
not-one, sameness and difference, etc.) then they cannot be combined directly in 
propositions. In some cases, derived statements can mutually or relationally participate in 
contrariety (e.g. s̄bo participates in s̄ relative to sb̄o), and opposing truth values can then 
be assigned to them, even if the interpretation is not exclusionary. In other cases, with 
certain hypotheses, the concept of opposition appears to take on a more restrictive 
meaning. Probably to prevent the emergence of new segments or levels, Plato states – this 
time in the more conventional, logical sense – that “the one that is not” (b̄o) is the 
complete opposite of “the not-one that is not” (b̄ō): 
Then just what is this hypothesis, “if unity is not”? Doesn’t it differ from “if not unity 
is not”? 
Of course. 
Does it only differ, or is it in fact completely opposite to say “unity is not” and “not 
unity is not”? 
Completely opposite.18 
Maintaining the symmetry between the basic sentences, “the one that is” (bo) and “the 
not-one that is” (bō) would also be negations of each other. It is very important to 
understand these opposing hypotheses in order to build the truth tables. However, it must 
be emphasised that these opposing truth values are restricted to the lower segments of the 
intelligible and generated realms. 
4.2 Justification of the symbols used 
It is dangerous to use a standard logical language when examining the arguments 
of the Parmenides, as this could distort the Platonic conception of the forms. That is what 
                                                          
18 Parmenides 160b-c, trans. cit. Burnet (1900-1907): ─Τίς οὖν ἂν εἴη αὕτη ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν; ἆρά 
τι διαφέρει τῆσδε, εἰ μὴ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν; ─Διαφέρει μέντοι. ─Διαφέρει μόνον, ἢ καὶ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν 
εἰ μὴ ἓν μὴ ἔστι τοῦ εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστιν; ─Πᾶν τοὐναντίον.  
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happens, for example, in a conventional logical formalisation of identity: does it remain 
as a form itself, or does it turn into an operator or a logical connector, like the 
biconditional? Is first-order logic sufficient to identify the role played by a “whole”? 
Should it be replaced with a universal quantifier? The same should also be said about its 
opposite, difference, which would be equated with exclusive disjunction and cause 
difficulties with the negation operator; the associated concept of “parts” would also be 
problematic, leading to the existential quantifier. It is too early to decide on the logical 
values that should be assigned to the forms within standard logical languages. 
I have tried to avoid these difficulties by using a simple and completely intuitive 
system of notation. Each form is represented by a letter. To indicate opposing forms, the 
same letter is used with or without an overline. Forms can be combined to produce 
formulae; these in turn can be combined into new formulae or higher-level relational 
expressions, which can be recognised in the notation as they are followed by a simple 
interpunct. When considering them separately, their ranges must be stated explicitly, but 
no confusion is caused when a formula immediately connects a sufficient number of 
forms. (The truth tables constructed for these formulae will have to indicate that they 
belong to different equivalence classes.) 
In the Platonic dialogues, letters of the alphabet often appear and are combined into 
syllables and words, as an example or model to illustrate dialectical procedures.19 Greek 
numerical notation did not generally use its own symbols, but used letters of the alphabet 
instead. Combinations of letters, based on the tables of opposites linked with 
Pythagoreanism and inspired by systems of numerical representation, may have been 
devised to denote the essences of things. 
The aporiae found in the first half of the Parmenides can be interpreted as an 
obscure method of indicating the rules to follow when combining forms (it is easier to 
define what must be done by starting with what cannot be done). In this sense, recreating 
the most basic symbolic system that Plato may hypothetically have used at the time, 
adapted to the Latin alphabet for greater convenience, is the best strategy for handling the 
difficulties of the dialogue. Once the rules are understood, it will be possible to investigate 
                                                          
19 See, among others, Theaetetus 203a-204a, Sophist 252e-253a, Statesman 277e-278e and Philebus 17b. 
Cf. Metaphysics 1043b-1044a and 1045a-b. 
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whether dialectics is compatible with a logical system or with a theory, understanding 
both concepts in the strictest logical sense used today. 
4.3 Truth tables for formulae belonging to the lower segments of the intelligible 
and generated realms 
The peculiarities of Plato’s philosophy do not prevent the use of truth tables (with 
minimal adaptations) for checking the consistency of this proposed reading of the 
Parmenides. This simply requires avoiding any treatment of individual forms as 
propositional variables; being aware that, although combining a form with others may 
implicitly introduce a certain operator, this does not reduce the form to that operator; and 
trying not to confound the truth values taken within basic sentences by the formulae 
derived by partition. Table 1 shows the truth values of the four main statements and the 
eight derived statements. Contradictory hypotheses were taken into account for its 
construction. I have also considered the doctrine, broadly expressed in the Sophist, that 
what is different from being is a part of not-being, which is used to identify those lower-
range formulae that belong to a single equivalence class. Preserving the symmetry, what 
is different from not-being is likewise a part of being:20 
 
Table 1: Truth tables for the formulae corresponding 
to one and not-one in the lower segments of the 
intelligible and generated realms 
bo b̄o bō b̄ō 
s̄bo sbo s̄b̄o sb̄o s̄bō sbō s̄b̄ō sb̄ō 
 
1 
0 
 
1 
 
 
0 
1 
 
 
0 
 
0 
1 
 
 
0 
1 
 
0 
 
 
1 
0 
 
 
1 
 
1 
0 
 
 
                                                          
20 See Sophist 256d-259d. Towards the end of the passage, Plato specifies that in some sort of fashion a 
thing is the same when it is different and different when it is the same, where one of the two is affected by 
what is said. It is fitting to equate not-being with “what is said in words”. (The table of values offered in 
the original Spanish version of the article has been revised.) 
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The logical expressions shown in Table 1 correspond to the lower segments of the 
intelligible and generated realms; it is only in these segments that formulae and 
hypotheses with opposing truth values can be identified. (In another paper, I provide a 
relational deduction of the statements corresponding to the upper segments and their truth 
tables; the criteria for identifying which relationships refer to the intelligible realm and 
which to the generated realm are also specified.21) By assigning truth values to the 
formulae, an effective tool is obtained that can be applied to the dialectic method, a 
procedure that uses division to systematically analyse the relationships of identity and 
contrariety that exist between the basic sentences. These truth tables are a valuable tool 
for dealing with the endless traps and ambiguities that run through the Parmenides. 
Throughout the entire dialogue, Plato tacitly and carefully follows certain rules that 
limit the two different types of participation. As previously and partially discussed: no 
form should be immediately linked with itself or with its opposite. Derived formulae that 
mutually participate in a form or in a group of forms with a higher range are subject to a 
similar restriction. The formulae in the lower segments that immediately participate in 
being communicate with those that participate in not-being; both groups must belong to 
hypotheses that differ but are not opposites in the absolute sense. (Note that Plato always 
avoids combining formulae that arise from dividing “the one that is” (bo) and “the not-
one that is” (bō) with each other; he also rejects the relational combination of formulae 
belonging to “the one that is not” (b̄o) and “the not-one that is not” (b̄ō).) 
 
5. The use of relational and immediate participation in the forms of likeness 
and unlikeness in Parmenides 148c-d. Overcoming the Third Man in relation to 
likeness (Parmenides 132d-133a) 
The formulae in Table 1 are well formed; the forms that compose them participate 
directly in each other, without any form being immediately combined with itself or its 
opposite. However, it is possible for a statement to participate in one form (or formula) 
with respect to another. I have shown some examples of this relational mode of 
participation in the case of sameness and difference; the linked propositions had an 
identical or contrary truth value. Something similar happens with the opposing forms of 
                                                          
21 See Matía Cubillo (a). 
13 
 
likeness (l) and unlikeness (l̄), in which the formulae allow not just immediate but also 
mutual or relational participation. In H2, sameness and difference in particular are used 
to identify the relationships of likeness and unlikeness. Once again, the deliberate 
ambiguity of the text and the absence of an explicit formal language serve to confuse the 
reader: 
So since unity is the same as the others, and because it is different, on both grounds 
or on either it is both like [ls∙l̄sb̄ō-l̄s̄bo] and unlike the others [l̄s̄∙ls̄b̄ō-lsbo]. 
Of course. 
So too in like manner for itself; since it appeared different from itself and the same 
as itself, on both grounds and on either it will appear like [ls∙l̄s̄b̄o-l̄sbo] and unlike 
itself [l̄s̄∙lsb̄o-ls̄bo]. 
Necessarily.22 
The meaning of the text is clarified by the symbols added in brackets. These are the same 
formulae that were obtained above when considering identity and contrariety, now adding 
the forms of likeness and unlikeness. The need for symbolisation is clear. What is being 
stated, in a free translation into less ambiguous language, is the following: 
Therefore, the one that is in its sameness, and the not-one that is not in its difference, 
will each by itself have likeness through their reciprocal participation in difference 
(s̄∙ls̄b̄ō-lsbo). And if difference affects the one that is and sameness affects the not-
one that is not, then they will separately be unlike through their mutual participation 
in the form that is the opposite of difference (s∙l̄sb̄ō-l̄s̄bo). But when the one and the 
not-one are linked as identical things, they shall be mutually alike because of this 
(ls∙sb̄ō-s̄bo), whereas they shall be relationally unlike when they are grouped 
together as things that are opposite to or different from each other (l̄s̄∙s̄b̄ō-sbo). 
Of course. 
Likewise, since the one that is, in its difference, and the one that is not, in its 
sameness, have been shown to be contrary to each other, will they not each 
separately have likeness (s̄∙lsb̄o-ls̄bo)? And won’t the one that is, in its sameness, 
and the one that is not, in its difference, be separately unlike through the reciprocal 
effect of identity (s∙l̄s̄b̄o-l̄sbo)? Also, depending on the other characteristic that must 
be assigned, i.e. whether they are relationally alike or unlike, won’t the one be like 
                                                          
22 Parmenides 148c-d, trans. cit. Burnet (1900-1907): ─Ταὐτόν τε ἄρα ὂν τὸ ἓν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ὅτι ἕτερόν 
ἐστι, κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα καὶ κατὰ ἑκάτερον, ὅμοιόν τε ἂν εἴη καὶ ἀνόμοιον τοῖς ἄλλοις. ─Πάνυ γε. ─Οὐκοῦν 
καὶ ἑαυτῷ ὡσαύτως, ἐπείπερ ἕτερόν τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ταὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ ἐφάνη, κατ᾽ ἀμφότερα καὶ κατὰ ἑκάτερον 
ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιον φανήσεται; ─Ἀνάγκη. 
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itself in cases where the groups are identical (ls∙s̄b̄o-sbo) and unlike when they are 
different (l̄s̄∙sb̄o-s̄bo)? 
Necessarily. 
In the lower segments, derived formulae that individually participate in likeness are 
relationally unlike, and those that are separately unlike are mutually alike. Despite Plato’s 
convoluted method of presenting this idea, intertwining immediate and relational uses of 
participation in the forms of sameness and difference and in likeness and unlikeness, it is 
a relatively simple response to the aporia considered in Parmenides 132d-133a, in the 
introduction to the dialogue: 
[…] these characters stand, as it were, as paradigms fixed in the nature of things, but 
the others resemble them and are likenesses of them, and this sharing that the others 
come to have of characters is nothing other than being a resemblance of them. 
Then if something resembles the character, he [Parmenides] said, is it possible for 
that character not to be like what has come to resemble it, just insofar as it has been 
made like it? Is there any device by which what is like is not like to what is like? 
There is not. 
But what is like necessarily has a share of one and the same character as what it is 
like? 
Yes. 
But will not that of which like things have a share so as to be like be the character 
itself? 
Certainly. 
So it is not possible for anything to be like the character, nor the character like 
anything else. Otherwise, another character will always make its appearance 
alongside the character, and should that be like something, a different one again, and 
continual generation of a new character will never stop, if the character becomes like 
what has a share of itself. 
You’re quite right.23 
                                                          
23 Parmenides 132d-133a, trans. cit. Burnet (1900-1907): ─ […] τὰ μὲν εἴδη ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα 
ἑστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις ἐοικέναι καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα, καὶ ἡ μέθεξις αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις 
γίγνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς. ─Εἰ οὖν τι, ἔφη, ἔοικεν τῷ εἴδει, οἷόν τε ἐκεῖνο τὸ 
εἶδος μὴ ὅμοιον εἶναι τῷ εἰκασθέντι, καθ’ ὅσον αὐτῷ ἀφωμοιώθη; ἢ ἔστι τις μηχανὴ τὸ ὅμοιον μὴ ὁμοίῳ 
ὅμοιον εἶναι; ─Οὐκ ἔστι. ─Τὸ δὲ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἆρ’ οὐ μεγάλη ἀνάγκη ἑνὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ [εἴδους] μετέχειν; 
─Ἀνάγκη. ─Οὗ δ’ ἂν τὰ ὅμοια μετέχοντα ὅμοια ᾖ, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος; ─Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 
─Οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τέ τι τῷ εἴδει ὅμοιον εἶναι, οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος ἄλλῳ· εἰ δὲ μή, παρὰ τὸ εἶδος ἀεὶ ἄλλο 
ἀναφανήσεται εἶδος, καὶ ἂν ἐκεῖνό τῳ ὅμοιον ᾖ, ἕτερον αὖ, καὶ οὐδέποτε παύσεται ἀεὶ καινὸν εἶδος 
γιγνόμενον, ἐὰν τὸ εἶδος τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μετέχοντι ὅμοιον γίγνηται. ─Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. 
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The form of likeness and whatever participates in it share a new form of likeness, 
different from the initial form, by virtue of which they are mutually alike. If, in turn, 
anything participates in this new emergent form of likeness, together they will relationally 
produce another form of likeness at a higher level; this process continues indefinitely. 
This vicious cycle in an infinite loop is one version of the Third Man Argument. Plato 
counters it by requiring formulae that are mutually alike to be separately unlike, and vice 
versa when they are mutually unlike. By introducing this rule, he in fact prevents the 
property of likeness from being used self-referentially, even relationally, which is the 
cause of the regression to infinity in the aporia.24 
This proposed technical solution will be more relevant when there is a real need to 
examine more complete higher-range formulae. (If deduced relationally, sbo∙ and sbō∙ 
will participate immediately in likeness, while s̄bo∙ and s̄bō∙ will participate in 
unlikeness.) With a better overview of the formal framework, it will be possible to try 
applying it to everyday situations where like or unlike things are discussed in natural 
language. At that time, it will be particularly interesting to examine the examples on 
friendship that are suggested in the Lysis dialogue, which are mixed in with the discussion 
on pre-Socratic principles of likeness.25 A decision will have to be made on whether 
symbolisation can be used to interpret these examples in a way that helps resolve the 
apparent contradictions found at the end of that work. 
The distinction between relational and immediate participation produces specific 
aporiae for some of the more general forms; this is what the first part of the Parmenides 
mainly seeks to demonstrate. Strict rules must be set to prevent paradoxes related to self-
reference. As with the forms of likeness and unlikeness, the peculiarities of being and not-
being, equal and unequal, large and small, older and younger, etc., must also be 
considered, avoiding the predictable objections. 
                                                          
24 This argument can be developed by identifying the well-formed expressions, starting from each 
individual form and the types of participation. Language and predication are relegated to not-being and 
cease to obstruct the reasoning. What is said and what is mutually participate in a formula at a higher range 
where truth and falsity, or their appearance, are decided (see Matía Cubillo (a)). Therefore, when dealing 
with this aporia, there has been no need to differentiate the form (F-ness or ΦF) from its use as a predicate 
(F). In his classic study of the Third Man, Vlastos (1995: 167 n. 5, 183 n. 39) considered this distinction to 
be logically and ontologically essential for understanding the aporia. More recent opinions, such as those 
of Pelletier and Zalta (2000: 167, 181-185), maintain this separation in the logical notation to prevent 
paradoxes like those of Russell. 
25 Cf. Lysis 213d-216b. 
16 
 
 
6. Applying the modes of participation to the generation of numbers in 
Parmenides 143e-144a 
Due to the scope of the thesis proposed in the previous paragraph, I will leave this 
matter for future research.26 Instead, I will now look at one final section of the Parmenides 
where the distinction between relational and immediate participation is also functional. 
Difficult and sometimes ignored, the beginning of H2 looks at the problem of the 
generation of numbers. When considering “the one that is” in its participation in 
difference (s̄bo), the forms of being, the one and difference are separable and can be 
regrouped into a number of odd or even terms.27 Surprisingly, Plato appears to defend the 
existence of some kind of correspondence between combinations of oddness and 
evenness and each number: 
So there will be even-times even numbers, odd-times odd numbers, even-times odd 
numbers, and odd-times even numbers. 
True. 
Then if this is so, do you think there is any number left which must not necessarily 
be? 
None whatever.28 
The meanings that are usually attributed to the expressions “even-times even 
number”, “even-times odd number”, “odd-times even number” and “odd-times odd 
number” follow the definitions given in Book VII of Euclid’s Elements: Definition 8 
states that “an even-times even number is that which is measured by an even number 
                                                          
26 See Matía Cubillo (a; b; c). 
27 See Parmenides 143a-d. 
28 Parmenides 143e-144a, trans. cit. Burnet (1900-1907): ─Ἄρτιά τε ἄρα ἀρτιάκις ἂν εἴη καὶ περιττὰ 
περιττάκις καὶ ἄρτια περιττάκις καὶ περιττὰ ἀρτιάκις. ─Ἔστιν οὕτω. ─Εἰ οὖν ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οἴει τινὰ 
ἀριθμὸν ὑπολείπεσθαι ὃν οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἶναι; ─Οὐδαμῶς γε.  
Long-held tradition, going back to Aristotle (see e.g. Metaphysics 987b), relates this passage to the 
generation of numbers. Allen (1997: 265-267) has argued that Plato is not discussing the formation of 
numbers, but rather demonstrating their existence and classification (excluding the prime numbers); his 
arguments are largely philological. Turnbull’s contribution (1998: 73-79) to the problem should also be 
mentioned. Turnbull uses what he calls the “three machine”, which can be equated to the formula s̄bo, to 
obtain the sequence of dyads or pairs 3, 9, 27, etc.; he also requires the “two machine”, which can be equated 
to the formula sbo, to produce the progression of simple terms 2, 4, 8, etc. By using different combinations 
of these two “machines”, he is able to construct the remaining numbers as dyads. His solution can be 
adapted to involve the opposing forms of identity and contrariety in the generation of numbers, but it cannot 
be used to determine them unambiguously. The same thing can be seen in a paper by Scolnicov (2003: 105-
106), who suggests obtaining the prime numbers larger than three by subtraction from even numbers. 
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according to an even number”.29 These are numbers that are products of two even 
numbers, i.e. the series 4, 8, 12, 16, etc. According to Definition 9, “an even-times odd 
number is that which is measured by an even number according to an odd number”.30 In 
principle, this would include all products of an even number and an odd number; however, 
Book IX Proposition 33 specifies that the number is “even-times odd only” (and not 
“even-times even also”) if it is the double of an odd number, thus producing the series 6, 
10, 14, 18, etc. The definition of “odd-times even number” is believed to have been a later 
interpolation from the Elements and is not used anywhere in that work; it is usually 
considered to indicate a certain type of even number.31 If that is so, then Definition 10 is 
problematic: “an odd-times odd number is that which is measured by an odd number 
according to an odd number”.32 It is believed that Euclid is referring here to the product 
of two odd numbers or, to put it another way, to composite odd numbers. This definition, 
which is also not found in the Elements, cannot be used to complete the set of all numbers 
because it does not include the prime numbers. This is clearly a problem because, as 
shown in the previous quotation from the Parmenides, Plato states that once the different 
types of odd and even number are known, there is no number left which must not 
necessarily be. 
It may be misguided to interpret Plato’s meaning based on an understanding of 
similar expressions in Euclid’s work, which was written later in time. In Plato’s work, 
odd and even are opposing forms that therefore cannot be combined directly; they also 
indicate the objects that are covered by these forms, the numbers, which can be generated 
from each other.33 It could be argued that “even” means “half of all numbers” and “odd” 
means “the other half of all numbers”, thus including every number. However, the real 
difficulty lies in unambiguously determining each number starting from the odd and even 
forms, using the possibilities offered by relational participation in the same form or in its 
opposite. How can this be done? 
                                                          
29 Elements VII def. 8, translation by Heath (1908). (Ἀρτιάκις ἄρτιος ἀριθμός ἐστιν ὁ ὑπὸ ἀρτίου ἀριθμοῦ 
μετρούμενος κατὰ ἄρτιον ἀριθμόν). 
30 Elements VII def. 9, trans. cit. (Ἀρτιάκις δὲ περισσός ἐστιν ὁ ὑπὸ ἀρτίου ἀριθμοῦ μετρούμενος κατὰ 
περισσὸν ἀριθμόν). 
31 See Heath (1908: 282-284). 
32 Elements VII def. 10, trans. cit. (Περισσάκις δὲ περισσὸς ἀριθμός ἐστιν ὁ ὑπὸ περισσοῦ ἀριθμοῦ 
μετρούμενος κατὰ περισσὸν ἀριθμόν). 
33 See Phaedo 103a ff. 
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If the even half of all numbers is taken and the first of these is separated out, the 
remaining even numbers can then be regrouped, separating them into an “even-even” 
series and an “even-odd” series; only their odd or even positions with respect to the first 
even number need to be considered. The same rule of division is then applied to each 
branch obtained. After the first term of the “even-even” series, the remaining terms of 
this series are regrouped into “even-even-even” or “even-even-odd”, and so on. The same 
procedure is used for the odd numbers: after the first, the remaining odd numbers are 
arranged into odd or even positions, and each of them creates new odd or even positions 
counting from there. Table 2 shows the first few series: 
 
  Table 2: Numerical series for the first even and odd species 
Even 
(2, 4, 6, …) 
Even-even 
(4, 8, 12, …) 
Even-even-even 
(8, 16, 24, …) 
Even-even-odd 
(12, 20, 28, …) 
Even-odd 
(6, 10, 14, …) 
Even-odd-even 
(10, 18, 26, …) 
Even-odd-odd 
(14, 22, 30, …) 
Odd 
(3, 5, 7, …) 
Odd-even 
(5, 9, 13, …) 
Odd-even-even 
(9, 17, 25, …) 
Odd-even-odd 
(13, 21, 29, …) 
Odd-odd 
(7, 11, 15, …) 
Odd-odd-even 
(11, 19, 27, …) 
Odd-odd-odd 
(15, 23, 31, …) 
 
Looking at Table 2, it is easy to identify the first term of each series. If 2 is taken 
as the first “even” number, “even-even” indicates the number 4, “even-odd” indicates 6, 
“even-even-even” indicates 8, etc.; if 3 is the first odd number, then “odd-even” indicates 
the number 5, “odd-odd” indicates 7, “odd-even-even” indicates 9, etc. Therefore, the 
numbers participate in the forms of odd or even both directly and in their mutual 
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relationships.34 This explanation makes it significantly easier to use a formal treatment, 
in terms of both set theory and mereology, of the Platonic concept of number: the quantity 
of series is the same as the quantity of natural numbers. The recursive division of the even 
numbers into odd and even series, and likewise for odd numbers, allows a one-to-one 
correspondence to be defined between the first term of each series and the natural number 
that immediately precedes it.35 It should also be recalled that the elements into which sbo 
is divided follow the pattern 2n (where n is a non-zero natural number) and constitute a 
countably infinite set. A bijection can thus be established between the terms of s̄bo and 
those of sbo, between the “parts” and the “whole”. While it is trivial to prove this with 
set theory, it is less clear when trying to prove it using the resources that may have been 
available to Plato. (It seems anachronistic to assume that this was his intention in 
Parmenides 142d-145a.) 
The interpretation described above allows the generation of all of the numbers, 
including those that are not covered by Euclid’s definitions, without having to introduce 
assumptions from outside of Plato’s philosophy. In particular, it obviates the need to rely 
on distant sources of Platonism such as Theon of Smyrna, who sees one as an odd number 
and considers “odd-odd” numbers to refer to the primes (“one times 5 is 5, one times 7 is 
7, and one times 11 is 11”).36 It is difficult to fit this explanation in with Plato’s words, 
and it contradicts his habit of treating the one as the beginning or part of the number and 
identifying this number with multiplicity. 
There are many mathematical questions that would be interesting to consider in the 
light of a new reading of the Parmenides. Attempts to tackle the paradoxes related to set 
theory have led to the development of different concepts of class. The Third Man 
Argument is very similar to some of these paradoxes. Plato’s strategy for confronting it, 
by setting strict rules for the immediate and relational uses of participation, deserves more 
attention. (At the same time, the distinction between the “whole” and the “parts” would 
have to be looked at in relation to the concept of the set.) Among other things, it would 
                                                          
34 Cf. Metaphysics 1004b. 
35 The referenced series have the same cardinality: they are countably infinite sets. For even numbers, each 
natural number can be made to correspond to its double, and vice versa, with each even number 
corresponding to half its value. In the “even-even” series, the bijection is established between the natural 
numbers and four times their value; a similar bijection is possible for all other series. At this point, I cannot 
help recalling D. Hilbert’s Infinite Hotel; no matter how complicated it is to prove, the set of all terms in 
all of the series, however often they are repeated, is also a countably infinite set. 
36 Theon of Smyrna (1979: 15). 
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also be worth exploring the problem of incommensurable magnitudes and the 
mathematical infinite from the perspective of H7 and its considerations of the latter: by 
analysing the logical relationships of the “not-one”, Plato argues that some pluralities 
have no true unity or number. The mathematical significance of this statement is made 
clearer by recalling that this hypothesis discusses certain “masses unlimited in multitude”, 
which appear to have unity and to combine with each other depending on the number, 
and even to limit each other despite not having limits.37 
 
7. Conclusions 
The logical tools developed in this article contribute to a more comprehensive 
reading of the framework of hypotheses in the Parmenides. Their potential and efficacy 
have been tested on different passages in response to problems that other interpretations 
have been unable to resolve. There are good arguments in their favour, particularly 
considering Plato’s premeditated effort to avoid providing any unequivocal textual 
evidence that could be used to assign a clear meaning to his arguments or to the dialogue 
in general; this issue has not always been given its due value, despite being the root cause 
of the lack of agreement in the specialist literature.38 A detailed philological examination 
of the texts is not sufficient to untangle the knots of language that are intended to affect 
and confuse the reader’s powers of reason. The exercise on the dialectic method that Plato 
provides as a model must be technically reconstructed before moving on to other 
questions. In that sense, this logical device opens up a wide range of possibilities and is 
essential for understanding the uncountable arguments that make up the Parmenides, 
particularly if the consistency of the set is assumed. 
 
 
                                                          
37 The Parmenides dialogue can corroborate some of Alonso Álvarez’ theories (2012: 50-58) on real 
numbers. Repeating the operation that leads to calculating a number with infinite decimal places produces 
a series of open intervals that grow endlessly narrower; if the unity they share is dispensed with as being 
somehow misleading (which appears to follow from the reasoning of the Parmenides in H7), the number 
disappears. 
38 See Rickless (Spring 2020). 
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